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Proxy signature is a useful cryptographic primitive that has been widely used in many applications. It has attracted a lot of attention
since it was introduced. There have been lots of works in constructing efficient and secure proxy signature schemes. In this paper,
we identify a new attack that has been neglected by many existing proven secure proxy signature schemes. We demonstrate this
attack by launching it against an identity-based proxy signature scheme which is proven secure. We then propose one method that
can effectively prevent this attack. The weakness in some other proxy signature schemes can also be fixed by applying the same
method.

1. Introduction
Proxy signature is a special type of digital signature which
allows one user (original signer) to delegate his/her signing
right to another signer (proxy signer). The latter can then
issue signatures on behalf of the former. The corresponding
proxy signature can be verified by the public that it is indeed
generated by the proxy signer with proper delegation from
the original signer [1, 2]. Proxy signature has been found
useful in many applications, such as distributed computing
[3], electronic commerce [4], mobile agents [5], and grid
computing [6]. It is worth noticing that proxy signature can
also serve as a useful tool in Internet of things (IoT), since
most of the RFID tags in IoT only have limited storage
and computing ability. For those operations involving a
large amount of computation, those tags can authorize the
tag readers with strong computing ability to perform those
operations with the help of a proxy signature scheme [7, 8].
The concept of proxy signature was introduced by
Mambo, Usuda, and Okamoto in 1996 [9]. They presented
three different types of proxy signature, namely, full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant in their
seminal work. Shortly after Mambo et al.’s work, Kim et al.

[10] proposed a new type of proxy signature combing partial
delegation and warrant. They demonstrated that schemes
combining partial delegation and warrant can provide a
higher level of security than schemes based on partial
delegation or warrant separately. Since then, proxy signature
has been extensively researched in different settings, such as
blind proxy signature [11], anonymous proxy signature [12],
and identity-based proxy signature [13].
These delegation-by-warrant proxy signature schemes
can be further classified into two categories according to
whether the proxy signature is generated by the proxy signer
using his own private key or not. In the first type, the proxy
signer generates a new proxy signing key using the delegation
information and his own private key. The proxy signatures
are generated under the new proxy signing key. The proxy
signature schemes in [5, 14–17] fall into the first type. In
the second type, the proxy signer issues a proxy signature
using his own private key. The proxy signatures are essentially
combinations of the original signer’s signature on the warrant
and the proxy signer’s signature on the message. Such proxy
signature schemes could be found in [13, 18–21].
On the security modelling of proxy signature, Boldyreva
et al. [22] proposed a comprehensive security model for
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the delegation-by-warrant proxy signature, where an original
signer can also perform self-delegation. Malkin et al. [23]
extended the security model to allow fully hierarchical
proxy signatures. They also proved that proxy signatures
are essentially equivalent to key-insulated signatures. The
security model proposed in [22, 23] is in the registered
key model, which means the adversary has to submit every
public and private key pair in the security game except the
challenge one. Later, Schuldt et al. [24] proposed an enhanced
security model for proxy signature by allowing the adversary
to query arbitrary proxy signing keys. Roughly speaking, a
secure proxy signature scheme should satisfy the following
requirements.
(i) Veriﬁability: given a proxy signature, a verifier can
be convinced that the proxy signature is indeed a
valid signature generated by the proxy signer with
proper delegation from an original signer on the
signed message.
(ii) Identiﬁability: given a proxy signature, a verifier is
able to determine the identities of the corresponding
original signer and proxy signer.
(iii) Unforgeability: no one, except the designated proxy
signer, can create a valid proxy signature.
(iv) Untenability: a proxy signer cannot deny at a later
time on a proxy signature that he has created before.
(v) Prevention of misuse: it is required in the first type
of proxy signature schemes that the proxy signing key
cannot be used for purposes other than creating proxy
signatures. Once misused, the identity of the misbehaving proxy signer can be determined explicitly.
1.1. Our Contribution. We revisit proxy signature and show
an attack that has been neglected by the second type of
proxy signature schemes [13, 18–21] that have been proven
secure. In these schemes, a proxy signature is essentially
the combination of the original signer’s standard signature
on a warrant and the proxy signer’s standard signature on
a message. In the security analysis, it is assumed that an
adversary has access to the original signer and proxy signer’s
standard signature oracles. We show that, under such a
circumstance, some proxy signature schemes [13, 18–21] that
have been previously proved secure are in fact not secure.
We demonstrate a new attack by launching it against an
identity-based proxy signature scheme [13] that has been
proven secure. We show that a malicious adversary can
create a proxy signature on a message, if he has access
to the standard signature of the original signer and proxy
signer, which is as defined in the security models in [13, 18].
Thus, these proxy signature schemes [13, 18–21], which we
believe is not a complete list, are in fact not secure. We
propose an efficient solution by revising the identity-based
proxy signature scheme [13] to thwart this attack. It is worth
noticing that the same method can also be applied to [18–21]
to resist this attack.
We have noticed there have been several works [5, 22]
aiming to transform normal proxy signature schemes into
strong ones. The authors in [22] suggested to add two

different prepositive tags “00” and “11” to distinguish the
signatures generated by the original signer and proxy signer.
However, this simple solution cannot prevent the attack
proposed in this paper according to the original security
model in [13]. The adversaries are able to query any message
of their choices. To stop the proxy signer from misusing the
proxy signing key, the authors in [5] classified existing proxy
signature schemes into strong and weak ones and proposed
one method to transform weak proxy signature schemes into
strong ones. However, as have been mentioned above, their
method is only applicable when a proxy signature is generated
from a proxy signing key which is created by the proxy signer
using the delegation information and his own private key.
Therefore, the method proposed in [5] is not suitable for the
scenarios discussed in this paper.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. We introduce some preliminaries in Section 2.
Then we present a new attack in some proxy signature
schemes in Section 3 by attacking an identity-based proxy
signature scheme. The security model for proxy signature
that captures the attack is presented in Section 4. We then
revise the identity-based proxy signature scheme in Section 5.
The security proof and efficiency analysis are presented in
Section 6 and the paper is concluded in Section 7.

2. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some preliminaries used
throughout this paper.
2.1. Bilinear Map. Let G1 , G2 be two cyclic groups of prime
order 𝑞 and 𝑃 a generator of G1 . The 𝑒 : G1 ×G1 → G2 is said
to be an admissible bilinear map if the following conditions
hold:
(i) Bilinearity: 𝑒(𝑎𝑃1 , 𝑏𝑃2 ) = 𝑒(𝑎𝑏𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) = 𝑒(𝑃1 , 𝑎𝑏𝑃2 ) for
all 𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ∈ G1 and 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞 .
(ii) Nondegeneracy: there exists 𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ∈ G1 such that
𝑒(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) ≠ 1G2 .
(iii) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to
compute 𝑒(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ) for all 𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ∈ G1 .
2.2. Complexity Assumption
Definition 1 (computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem).
Given 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃 ∈ G1 for some random 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ Z𝑞 , compute
𝑎𝑏𝑃 ∈ G1 . Define the success probability of a polynomial
algorithm A in solving the CDH problem as
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐷𝐻
A,G1 (𝜅) = Pr [A (𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃) = 𝑎𝑏𝑃 : 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞 ]

(1)

where 𝜅 = log(𝑞) is the security parameter. The CDH assumption states that, for any polynomial algorithm adversary A,
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐷𝐻
A,G1 (𝜅) is negligible in 𝜅.
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3. A New Attack in Some Proxy
Signature Schemes
In this section, we present an attack that has been neglected
by many existing proxy signature schemes [13, 18–21]. To
better explain how an attacker works, we demonstrate this
attack via a concrete example. Before we start to introduce
the attack, we first review an identity-based proxy signature
scheme proposed in [13].

(i) A𝐼 , which is an outsider adversary that has knowledge
of (𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ),

3.1. An Identity-Based Proxy Signature Scheme
(1) Setup: let 𝑒 : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing
map, where G1 and G2 are of prime order 𝑞. Let 𝑃 be
a generator of G1 . Choose a random number 𝑠 ∈ Z∗𝑞
and set 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑠𝑃. Select three collision-resistant
hash functions 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 such that 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1 . The system parameters 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 =
{𝑒, G1 , G2 , 𝑞, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 , 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 }, the master secret key
𝑀𝑠𝑘 = 𝑠.
(2) KeyExtract: on input a user’s identity 𝐼𝐷, output the
secret key for this identity 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 = 𝑠𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷).
(3) StandardSign: on input a message 𝑚, the standard
signature on 𝑚 under identity 𝐼𝐷 is 𝜎 = (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) such
that 𝜎1 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 + 𝑟𝐻1 (𝑀) and 𝜎2 = 𝑟𝑃, where 𝑟 ∈ Z𝑞 .
(4) StandardVer: on input a standard signature 𝜎 =
(𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) of message 𝑚 under identity 𝐼𝐷, output “1”
if 𝑒(𝜎1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒(𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷), 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )𝑒(𝐻1 (𝑚), 𝜎2 ); otherwise,
output “0”.
(5) DelegationGen: let 𝑤 be a warrant that includes
the delegation information such as the identities of
the original signer and the designated proxy signer,
the delegation period, the types of messages that a
proxy signer can sign, and so on. Then the original
signer with identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 generates the delegation
information 𝜎𝑤 = (𝜎𝑊1 , 𝜎𝑊2 ) such that 𝜎𝑊1 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 +
𝑟𝐴 𝐻1 (𝑚𝑤 ) and 𝜎𝑊2 = 𝑟𝐴 𝑃, where 𝑟𝐴 ∈ Z𝑞 . The
original signer sends the delegation signing key 𝜎𝑤 to
the proxy signer.
(6) ProSign: upon receiving the delegation information
𝜎𝑤 = (𝜎𝑊1 , 𝜎𝑊2 ) and 𝑤 from the original signer,
the proxy signer with identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 generates a proxy
signature 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ) on a message 𝑚 such
that 𝜎𝑀1 = 𝜎𝑊1 + 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵 𝐻2 (𝑚), 𝜎𝑀2 = 𝜎𝑊2 ,
𝜎𝑀3 = 𝑟𝐵 𝑃.
(7) ProVer: on input the identities 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 of the
original signer and proxy signer, a warrant 𝑤 ∈ {0, 1}∗
and a message 𝑚 ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the proxy signature
𝜎 = (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ), output “1” if
𝑒 (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 ) 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤) , 𝜎𝑀2 )
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 ) 𝑒 (𝐻2 (𝑚) , 𝜎𝑀3 ) .
Otherwise, output “0”.

3.2. An Attack against the ID-Based Proxy Signature Scheme.
Wu et al.’s identity-based proxy signature scheme [13] is
proven secure. However, we show below that if the original
signer and proxy signer also use their private keys to generate
standard signatures, which is just as defined in their security
models, then their scheme could be broken by a malicious
outsider attacker. Assume the identities of the original signer
and proxy signer are 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 , respectively, in the security
model in [13], three types of adversaries are defined, namely,

(2)

(ii) A𝐼𝐼 , which is a malicious proxy signer that has
knowledge of (𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 ),
(iii) A𝐼𝐼𝐼 , which is a malicious original signer that has
knowledge of (𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ).
The original signer and proxy signer could use the same
key pairs to generate normal signatures using the standard
signature scheme introduced in [13]. Suppose A𝐼 aims to
generate a proxy signature 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ) on a message
𝑚 with a warrant 𝑤; it is worth noticing that A𝐼 might
obtain such a genius warrant 𝑤 when verifying a valid proxy
signature. Then A𝐼 acts as follows:
(i) A𝐼 requires a standard signature (𝜎𝐴 1 , 𝜎𝐴 2 ) on warrant 𝑤 of the original signer with identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴, where
𝑤 is a warrant containing the delegation information.
The original signer chooses a random 𝑟𝐴 ∈ Z𝑞 and
generates the standard signature (𝜎𝐴 1 , 𝜎𝐴 2 ) such that
𝜎𝐴 1 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 + 𝑟𝐴𝐻1 (𝑤) and 𝜎𝐴 2 = 𝑟𝐴𝑃.
(ii) Upon receiving the standard signature (𝜎𝐴 1 , 𝜎𝐴 2 ) on
𝑤 from the original signer. A𝐼 aborts if 𝑒(𝜎𝐴 1 , 𝑃) ≠
𝑒(𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴), 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )𝑒(𝐻1 (𝑤), 𝜎𝐴 2 ).
(iii) A𝐼 requires a standard signature (𝜎𝐵1 , 𝜎𝐵2 ) on message 𝑤 ‖ 𝑚 of the proxy signer with identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ,
where 𝑚 is a message. The proxy signer chooses a
random 𝑟𝐵 ∈ Z𝑞 and generates the standard signature
(𝜎𝐵1 , 𝜎𝐵2 ) such that 𝜎𝐵1 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵 𝐻2 (𝑤, 𝑚) and
𝜎𝐵2 = 𝑟𝐵 𝑃.
(iv) Upon receiving the standard signature (𝜎𝐵1 , 𝜎𝐵2 ) on
𝑚 from the proxy signer. A𝐼 aborts if 𝑒(𝜎𝐵1 , 𝑃) ≠
𝑒(𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ), 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )𝑒(𝐻2 (𝑤, 𝑚), 𝜎𝐵2 ).
(v) If both (𝜎𝐴 1 , 𝜎𝐴 2 ) and (𝜎𝐵1 , 𝜎𝐵2 ) are valid. A𝐼 outputs
a proxy signature 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ) on message 𝑚
with warrant 𝑤 such that 𝜎𝑀1 = 𝜎𝐴 1 + 𝜎𝐵1 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 +
𝑟𝐴 𝐻1 (𝑤) + 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵 𝐻2 (𝑤, 𝑚), 𝜎𝑀2 = 𝜎𝐴 2 = 𝑟𝐴 𝑃 and
𝜎𝑀3 = 𝜎𝐵2 = 𝑟𝐵 𝑃.
It can be verified that 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ) is a valid proxy
signature. Thus, the proposed identity-based proxy signature
is insecure, since given a proxy signature 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ),
it might come from a malicious adversary. The proposed
attack is a practical attack since a malicious adversary could
launch such an attack without notice of both the original
signer and the proxy signer. Besides the scheme mentioned
in this paper, we have found that the proxy signature schemes
in [18–21] are also subjected to this attack.
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4. Security Model for Proxy Signature
4.1. Malicious Attackers. We revise the security model for
identity-based proxy signature defined in [13] to capture the
new attack in this section. In the security model for proxy
signature, the capability of an adversary is modelled by its
ability to query different oracles. Before we formally define
each adversarial game, we first introduce four types of oracle
queries that will appear in the models:
(i) Key extract query: A can query an identity 𝐼𝐷 ∈
ID, where ID represents the identity space, to the
key extract oracle O𝐾𝐸 (⋅). The corresponding key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷
is then generated and returned to A.
(ii) Original signer’s standard signing query: A can
query the original signer’s signing oracle O𝑂𝑆 𝑆 (⋅)
with any warrant 𝑤 ∈ W under the original
signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷 ∈ ID, where W represents the
warrant space. The private key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 on identity 𝐼𝐷 is
generated using the key extraction algorithm. The
corresponding original signer’s signature 𝜎𝑜 on warrant 𝑤 is generated and returned to A.
(iii) Proxy signing query: A can query the proxy signing
oracle O𝑃𝑆 (⋅) with any message 𝑚 ∈ M with warrant
𝑤 ∈ W of his choice under the original signer’s
identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 and the proxy signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵
such that 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ∈ ID, where M represents
the message space. The private keys 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 and 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵
on identities 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 are generated using the key
extraction algorithm. A valid proxy signature on 𝑚 is
then generated and returned to A.
(iv) Proxy signer’s signing query: A can query the
standard signature with any message 𝑚 ∈ M of his
choice to the proxy signer’s standard signing oracle
O𝑃𝑆 𝑆 (⋅). A valid standard signature of the proxy signer
𝜎𝑝 on 𝑚 under the proxy signer’s identity is then
generated and returned to A.
According to the information held by an attacker, three
different types of adversaries are defined:
(1) A𝐼 : an outsider attacker who only has the identities of
the original signer and the proxy signer that aims to
forge a valid proxy signature.
(2) A𝐼𝐼 : a malicious proxy signer who possesses the
private key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 of the proxy signer and the identity
of the original signer, and tries to forge a valid proxy
signature 𝜎 without knowledge of the private key
𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 of the original signer.
(3) A𝐼𝐼𝐼 : a malicious original signer that possesses the
private key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 of the original signer and the
identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 of the proxy signer, and tries to forge a
valid proxy signature 𝜎 without knowing the private
key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 of the proxy signer.
4.2. Adversarial Game with a Malicious Outsider Adversary
A𝐼 . We first define the adversarial game between a malicious
outsider adversary A𝐼 and a simulator S as follows:

(i) Setup: the simulator S runs Setup algorithm to
generate the 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 and 𝑀𝑆𝐾 and sends 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 to
A𝐼 as well as keeping 𝑀𝑆𝐾 secret.
(ii) Original signer’s standard signing queries: A𝐼 can
choose any warrant 𝑤 ∈ W with the original signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 and queries the original
signer’s standard signing oracle O𝑂𝑆 𝑆 . S generates
the private key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 using the key extract algorithm 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 ← KeyExtract(𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠);
then S generates the delegation information 𝜎𝑜 ←
StandardSign(𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝑤, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠) and sends 𝜎𝑜 to A𝐼 .
(iii) Proxy Signer’s Standard Signature Queries: A𝐼
queries the proxy signer’s standard signing oracle
O𝑃𝑆 𝑆 with a message 𝑚 ∈ M of his choice under
the proxy signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ∈ ID. S generates
the private key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 using the key extract algorithm 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 ← KeyExtract(𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠);
then S generates the standard signature 𝑠𝜎 ←
StandardSign(𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑚, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠) and sends 𝑠𝜎 to A𝐼 .
(iv) Forgery Phase: finally, A𝐼 outputs a proxy signature
𝜎∗ on message 𝑀∗ for a warrant 𝑊∗ with the original
signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 and the proxy signer’s identity
𝐼𝐷𝐵 .
We say A𝐼𝐼 wins the game if
(i) ProVer(𝜎∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ ) = 1;

(ii) (𝑊∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐴 ) has been queried to the original signer’s
standard signing oracle O𝑂𝑆 𝑆 ;

(iii) (𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) has been queried to the proxy signer’s
standard signing oracle O𝑃𝑆 𝑆 .
Define the advantage of a malicious adversary A𝐼 in winning
the game as
𝐴𝑑VA𝐼 (𝜅) = Pr [A𝐼 Wins the game] .

(3)

Definition 2. We say an identity-based proxy signature
scheme is secure against an outsider adversary A𝐼 if for any
probabilistic polynomial time A𝐼 , 𝐴𝑑VA𝐼 (𝜅) is negligible in 𝜅.
4.3. Adversarial Game with a Malicious Proxy Signer A𝐼𝐼 . We
first define the adversarial game between a malicious proxy
signer A𝐼𝐼 and a simulator S as follows:
(i) Setup: the simulator S runs Setup algorithm to
generate the 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 and 𝑀𝑆𝐾 and sends 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 to
A𝐼𝐼 as well as keeping 𝑀𝑆𝐾 secret.
(ii) Key extract queries: A𝐼𝐼 selects an identity 𝐼𝐷 such
that 𝐼𝐷 ∈ ID, the simulator S runs 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 ←
KeyExtract(𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝐼𝐷, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠) and returns 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 to
A𝐼𝐼 .
(iii) Original signer’s standard signing queries: A𝐼𝐼
can choose any warrant 𝑤 ∈ W with an identity
𝐼𝐷 ∈ ID and queries original signer’s standard
signing oracle O𝑂𝑆 𝑆 . S generates the private
key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 using the key extract algorithm 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 ←
KeyExtract(𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝐼𝐷, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠); then S generates the
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original signer’s standard signature 𝜎𝑜
←
StandardSign(𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷, 𝑤, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠) and sends 𝜎𝑜 to
A𝐼𝐼 .
(iv) Proxy signing queries: A𝐼𝐼 chooses a warrant 𝑤 ∈ W
and a message 𝑚 ∈ M and queries the proxy signing
oracle O𝑃𝑆 with the original signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷1 and
the proxy signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷2 . S generates
𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷1 , 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷2
← KeyExtract (𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝐼𝐷1 , 𝐼𝐷2 , 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠)
𝜎𝑤 ← DelegationGen (𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷1 , 𝑤, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠) ,

(4)

𝜎 ← ProSign (𝜎𝑤 , 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷2 , 𝑚, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠)

We say A𝐼𝐼𝐼 wins the game if
(i) ProVer(𝜎∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ ) = 1;
(ii) 𝐼𝐷𝐵 has not been queried to the key extraction oracle
O𝐾𝐸 ;

(iii) (𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) has not been queried to the proxy
signer’s standard signing oracle O𝑃𝑆 𝑆 ;

(iv) (𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) has not been queried to the
proxy signing oracle O𝑃𝑆 .

Define the advantage of a malicious adversary A𝐼𝐼𝐼 in
winning the game as

and returns 𝜎 to A𝐼𝐼 .
(v) Forgery Phase: finally, A outputs a proxy signature
𝜎∗ on message 𝑀∗ for a warrant 𝑊∗ with the original
signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 and the proxy signer’s identity
𝐼𝐷𝐵 .
We say A𝐼𝐼 wins the game if
(i) ProVer(𝜎∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ ) = 1;
(ii) 𝐼𝐷𝐴 has not been queried to the key extraction oracle
O𝐾𝐸 (⋅);

(iii) (𝑊∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐴) has not been queried to the delegation
oracle O𝐷𝐺;

(iv) (𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ , 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) has not been queried to the
proxy signing oracle O𝑃𝑆 .

Define the advantage of a malicious adversary A𝐼𝐼 in winning
the game as
𝐴𝑑VA𝐼𝐼 (𝜅) = Pr [A𝐼𝐼 Wins the game] .

(iii) Forgery Phase: finally, A𝐼𝐼𝐼 outputs a proxy signature
𝜎∗ on message 𝑀∗ for a warrant 𝑊∗ with the original
signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 and the proxy signer’s identity
𝐼𝐷𝐵 .

(5)

Definition 3. We say an identity-based proxy signature
scheme is secure against the A𝐼𝐼 under chosen identity and
warrant attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial time A𝐼𝐼 ,
𝐴𝑑VA𝐼𝐼 (𝜅) is negligible in 𝜅.
4.4. Adversarial Game with Malicious Original Signer. The
adversarial game between a malicious original signer A𝐼𝐼𝐼
and a simulator S is defined as follows:
(i) Setup, Key Extract Queries and Proxy Signing
Queries are the same as those in the adversarial game
against a malicious proxy signer.
(ii) Proxy Signer’s Standard Signature Queries: A𝐼𝐼𝐼
queries the proxy signer’s standard signing oracle
O𝑝𝑠 𝑠 with a message 𝑚 ∈ M of his choice
under an identity 𝐼𝐷 ∈ ID. S generates
the private key 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 using the key extract algorithm 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 ← KeyExtract(𝑀𝑆𝐾, 𝐼𝐷, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠);
then S generates the standard signature 𝜎𝑝 ←
StandardSign(𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷, 𝑚, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠) and sends 𝜎𝑝 to
A𝐼𝐼𝐼 .

𝐴𝑑VA𝐼I𝐼 (𝜅) = Pr [A𝐼𝐼𝐼 Wins the game] .

(6)

Definition 4. We say an identity-based proxy signature
scheme is secure against the A𝐼𝐼𝐼 under chosen identity and
message attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial time A𝐼𝐼𝐼 ,
𝐴𝑑VA𝐼𝐼𝐼 (𝜅) is negligible in 𝜅.

5. The Revised Identity-Based
Proxy Signature Scheme
We present the revised ID-based proxy signature scheme that
efficiently thwarts the proposed attack in this section.
(1) Setup: let 𝑒 : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing
map, where G1 and G2 are of prime order 𝑞. Let 𝑃 be
a generator of G1 . Choose a random number 𝑠 ∈ Z∗𝑞
and set 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑠𝑃. Select three collision-resistant
hash functions 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 such that 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1 . The system parameters 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 =
{𝑒, G1 , G2 , 𝑞, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 , 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 }, the master secret key
𝑀𝑠𝑘 = 𝑠.
(2) KeyExtract: on input a user’s identity 𝐼𝐷, output the
secret key for this identity 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 = 𝑠𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷).
(3) StandardSign: on input a message 𝑚, the standard
signature on 𝑚 under identity 𝐼𝐷 is 𝜎 = (𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) such
that 𝜎1 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷 + 𝑟𝐻1 (𝑚) and 𝜎2 = 𝑟𝑃, where 𝑟 ∈ Z∗𝑞 .
(4) StandardVer: on input a standard signature 𝜎 =
(𝜎1 , 𝜎2 ) of message 𝑚 under identity 𝐼𝐷, output “1”
if 𝑒(𝜎1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒(𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷), 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )𝑒(𝐻1 (𝑚), 𝜎2 ); otherwise,
output “0”.
(5) DelegationGen: let 𝑤 be a warrant that includes
the delegation information such as the identities of
the original signer and the designated proxy signer,
the delegation period, the types of messages that a
proxy signer can sign, and so on. Then the original
signer with identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 generates the delegation
information 𝜎𝑤 = (𝜎𝑊1 , 𝜎𝑊2 ) such that 𝜎𝑊1 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐴 +
𝑟𝐴 𝐻1 (𝑤) and 𝜎𝑊2 = 𝑟𝐴𝑃, where 𝑟𝐴 ∈ Z𝑞 . The original
signer sends the delegation information 𝜎𝑤 to the
proxy signer.
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(6) ProSign: upon receiving the delegation information
𝜎𝑤 = (𝜎𝑊1 , 𝜎𝑊2 ) and 𝑤 from the original signer,
the proxy signer with identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 generates a proxy
signature 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 on a message 𝑚 such
that 𝜎𝑀1 = 𝜎𝑊1 + 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵 𝐻2 (𝑤, 𝑚) + 𝑟𝐵 𝐻1 (𝑤),
𝜎𝑀2 = 𝜎𝑊2 + 𝑟𝐵 𝑃, 𝜎𝑀3 = 𝑟𝐵 𝑃.
(7) ProVer: on input the identities 𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 of the
original signer and proxy signer, a warrant 𝑤
and a message 𝑚 and the proxy signature 𝜎 =
(𝜎𝑀1 , 𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ), outputs “1” if 𝑒(𝜎𝑀1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒(𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴),
𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )𝑒(𝐻1 (𝑤)), 𝜎𝑀2 ) ⋅ 𝑒(𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ), 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )𝑒(𝐻2 (𝑤, 𝑚),
𝜎𝑀3 ). Otherwise, output “0”.

6. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of the revised ID-based
proxy signature scheme against A𝐼 , A𝐼𝐼 , and A𝐼𝐼𝐼 adversaries.
Theorem 5. The revised ID-based proxy signature scheme is
secure against an outsider adversary A𝐼 if the CDH assumption
holds.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction under the random oracle
model. Suppose there exists an outsider adversary A𝐼 that
has a nonnegligible advantage 𝜖 in attacking the proposed
scheme; then we can build another algorithm B that uses
A𝐼 to solve the CDH problem. Let G1 be a bilinear pairing
group of prime order 𝑞; B is given 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃 ∈ G1 which is a
random instance of the CDH problem. Its goal is to compute
𝑎𝑏𝑃. Algorithm B will simulate the challenger and interact
with the forger A𝐼 as described below.
(1) Setup: B selects a bilinear map 𝑒 : G1 × G1 → G2
where G1 and G2 are of prime order 𝑞. B chooses a
generator 𝑃 of G1 . Let (𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃) be the inputs of the
CDH problem. B sets the master public key 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 =
𝑠𝑃, where 𝑠 ∈ Z∗𝑞 . B selects three collision-resistant
hash functions 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 . B sends
(𝑒, G1 , G2 , 𝑞, 𝑃, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 , 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 ) to A𝐼𝐼 .
(2) Hash queries: in the security proof, the hash functions 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 are modelled as random oracles. We
regard the identity, warrant, and message queries as
𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , and 𝐻2 queries, respectively. Assume B keeps
hash tables 𝑇0 , 𝑇1 , and 𝑇2 for these queries.
(a) 𝐻0 Query: for each query on identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 , if
𝐼𝐷𝑖 has existed in 𝑇0 , the same value 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 )
is returned to A𝐼𝐼 . Otherwise, B chooses a
random 𝑐𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and sets 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑖 𝑃. B sends
𝑐𝑖 𝑃 to A𝐼 as well as stores (𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖 , 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 )) to 𝑇0 .
(b) 𝐻1 Query: assume A𝐼 makes 𝑞𝐻1 warrant
queries; B selects a random number 𝛽 ∈
(1, 𝑞𝐻1 ), for each query on warrant 𝑤𝑖 such that
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≠ 𝛽 ≤ 𝑞𝐻1 ; if 𝑤𝑖 has existed in 𝑇1 , the same
value 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) is returned to A𝐼 . Otherwise,
(i) if 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 , B chooses a random 𝑘𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞
and sets 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃. B sends 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) to
A𝐼 as well as storing (𝑤𝛽 , 𝑘𝑖 , 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 )) to 𝑇1 .

(ii) If 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 , B sets 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) = 𝑎𝑃. B sends
𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) to A𝐼 .
(c) 𝐻2 Query: for each query on message 𝑚𝑖
accompanying with a warrant 𝑤𝑖 , if 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )
has existed in 𝑇2 , the same value 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )
is returned to A𝐼 . Otherwise, B chooses a
random 𝑢𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and sets 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃.
B sends 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) to A𝐼 as well as storing
((𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ), 𝑢𝑖 , 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , m𝑖 )) to 𝑇2 .
(3) Original signer’s standard signing queries: A𝐼 can
query the original signer’s standard signature on a
warrant 𝑤𝑖 . Assume A𝐼 makes 𝑞𝑜𝑠 𝑠 queries with the
original signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴, for each query on 𝑤𝑖 ,
assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) and 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) have existed in 𝑇0 and
𝑇1 ; if they are not the cases, B performs the above
algorithms to assign values for 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) and 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ).
Assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) = 𝑐𝐴 𝑃, B simulates as follows:
(i) If 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 , assume 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃; then B
chooses randomly 𝑟𝐴 𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and sets 𝜎𝑤𝑖 =
(𝜎𝑤𝑖1 , 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 ) such that 𝜎𝑤𝑖1 = 𝑐𝐴 𝑠𝑃 + 𝑟𝐴 𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 =
𝑠𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) + 𝑟𝐴 𝑖 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) and 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 = 𝑟𝐴 𝑖 𝑃.
(ii) If 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 , then B chooses randomly 𝑟𝐴 𝛽 ∈
Z𝑞 and sets 𝜎𝛽 = (𝜎𝑤𝛽1 , 𝜎2𝛽2 ) such that 𝜎𝑤𝛽1 =
𝑐𝐴 𝑠𝑃 + 𝑟𝐴 𝛽 𝑏𝑃 = 𝑠𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) + 𝑟𝐴 𝛽 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) and
𝜎𝑤𝛽2 = 𝑟𝐴 𝛽 𝑃.
(4) Proxy signer’s standard signing queries: assume A𝐼
makes 𝑞𝑝𝑠 𝑠 standard signature queries under the
proxy signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 . For each query on 𝑀𝑖 =
𝑤𝑖 ‖ 𝑚𝑖 , assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) and 𝐻2 (𝑀𝑖 ) have existed
in 𝑇0 and 𝑇2 ; if they are not the cases, B performs
the above algorithms to assign values for 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴)
and 𝐻2 (𝑀𝑖 ). Assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) = 𝑐𝐵 𝑃; B chooses a
number 𝛿 ∈ (1, 𝑞𝑝𝑠 𝑠 ) and simulates as follows:
(i) If 𝑀𝑖 ≠ 𝑀𝛿 , assume 𝐻2 (𝑀2 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃; then B
chooses randomly 𝑟𝐵𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and sets 𝜎𝑝𝑖 =
(𝜎𝑝𝑖1 , 𝜎𝑝𝑖2 ) such that 𝜎𝑝𝑖1 = 𝑐𝐵 𝑠𝑃 + 𝑟𝐵𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 =
𝑠𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) + 𝑟𝐵𝑖 𝐻2 (𝑀𝑖 ) and 𝜎𝑝𝑖1 = 𝑟𝐵𝑖 𝑃.
(ii) If 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀𝛿 , assume 𝐻2 (𝑀𝛿 ) = 𝑢𝛿 𝑃; then B
sets 𝑑𝑠𝑘𝛿 = (𝜎𝐵1𝛿 , 𝜎𝐵2𝛿 ) such that 𝜎𝐵1𝛿 = 𝑐𝐵 𝑠𝑃 +
𝑏𝑢𝛿 𝑃 = 𝑠𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) + 𝑏𝐻2 (𝑀𝛿 ) and 𝜎𝐵2𝑖 = 𝑏𝑃.
(5) Forgery: assume A𝐼 outputs a valid proxy signature
∗
∗
∗
, 𝜎𝑀
, 𝜎𝑀
) on message 𝑀∗ under a warrant
𝜎∗ = (𝜎𝑀
1
2
3
∗
𝑊 with the proxy signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 and the proxy
signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 . Besides,
(i) (𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝑊∗ ) has been queried in the original
signer’s standard signing queries;
(ii) (𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ ) has been queried in the proxy
signer’s standard signing queries.
If 𝑊∗ ≠ 𝑤𝛽 or 𝑀∗ ≠ 𝑀𝛿 , B will abort. Other∗
wise, given the forged proxy signature 𝜎∗ = (𝜎𝑀
,
1
∗
∗
𝜎𝑀2 , 𝜎𝑀3 ). B can solve the CDH problem
𝑎𝑏𝑃 = 𝜎𝑀1∗ − 𝜎𝐴1𝛽 − 𝜎𝐵1𝛿
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B will not abort when 𝑊∗ = 𝑤𝛽 and 𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝛿 . Thus, if
there exists an outsider adversary A𝐼 that has a nonnegligible
probability 𝜖 in breading the proposed identity-based proxy
signature scheme, then there exists another probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm B that has a probability
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐷𝐻
B,G1 =

𝜖
𝑞𝑜𝑠 𝑠 ⋅ 𝑞𝑝𝑠 𝑠

(8)

which is nonnegligible. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
Theorem 6. The revised ID-based proxy signature scheme is
secure against the A𝐼𝐼 chosen identity and chosen warrant
attacks if the CDH assumption holds.
Proof. Let us recall the definition of A𝐼𝐼 ; A𝐼𝐼 is a malicious
proxy signer possessing the private key of the proxy signer.
With this in mind, the simulation is as follows:
(1) Setup: B selects a bilinear map 𝑒 : G1 × G1 → G2 ,
where G1 and G2 are of prime order 𝑞. B chooses
a generator 𝑃 of G1 . Let (𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃) be the inputs
of the CDH problem. B sets the master public key
𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑎𝑃. B selects three collision-resistant hash
functions 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 . B sends
(𝑒, G1 , G2 , 𝑞, 𝑃, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 , 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , 𝐻2 ) to A𝐼𝐼 .
(2) Hash queries: regard the identity, warrant, and message queries as 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , and 𝐻2 queries, respectively.
B keeps hash tables 𝑇0 , 𝑇1 , and 𝑇2 for these queries.
(a) 𝐻0 Query: assume A𝐼𝐼 makes 𝑞𝐻0 identity
queries, choose 𝛼 ∈ (1, 𝑞𝐻0 ), for each query on
identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 such that 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≠ 𝛼 ≤ 𝑞𝐻0 , if 𝐼𝐷𝑖 has
existed in 𝑇0 , the same value 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) is returned
to A𝐼𝐼 . Otherwise,
(i) If 𝑖 ≠ 𝛼, B chooses a random 𝑐𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and
sets 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑖 𝑃. B sends 𝑐𝑖 𝑃 to A𝐼𝐼 as
well as storing (𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖 , 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 )) to 𝑇0 .
(ii) If 𝑖 = 𝛼, B sets 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝛼 ) = 𝑏𝑃 + 𝑐𝛼 𝑃, where
𝑐𝛼 ∈ Z𝑞 and returns 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐼 ) to A𝐼𝐼 . B
adds (𝐼𝐷𝛼 , 𝑐𝛼 , 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝛼 )) to 𝑇0 .
(b) 𝐻1 Query: assume A𝐼𝐼 makes 𝑞𝐻1 warrant
queries; B selects a random number 𝛽 ∈
(1, 𝑞𝐻1 ), for each query on warrant 𝑤𝑖 such that
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≠ 𝛽 ≤ 𝑞𝐻1 , if 𝑤𝑖 has existed in 𝑇1 , the same
value 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) is returned to AI𝐼 . Otherwise,
(i) if 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑜 , which means 𝐼𝐷𝛼 is
included in 𝑤𝑖 and the user with identity
𝐼𝐷𝛼 plays the role of original signer in the
system. B chooses a random 𝑘𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and
sets 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃. B sends 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) to
A𝐼𝐼 as well as storing (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 , 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 )) to 𝑇1 ;
(ii) if 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑝 , which means 𝐼𝐷𝛼 is
included in 𝑤𝑖 and the user with identity
𝐼𝐷𝛼 plays the role of proxy signer in the
system. B chooses a random 𝑘𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and
sets 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃. B sends 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) to A𝐼𝐼
as well as stores (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖 , 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 )) to 𝑇1 ;

(iii) if 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 , B chooses a random 𝑘𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞
and sets 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃. B sends 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) to
A𝐼𝐼 as well as storing (𝑤𝛽 , 𝑘𝑖 , 𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 )) to 𝑇1 .
(c) 𝐻2 Query: assume A𝐼𝐼 makes 𝑞𝐻2 message
queries, B selects a random number 𝛿 ∈
(1, 𝑞𝐻1 ), for each query on message 𝑚𝑖 accompanying with a warrant 𝑤𝑖 such that 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≠
𝛿 ≤ 𝑞𝐻2 , if 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) has existed in 𝑇2 , the same
value 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) is returned to A𝐼𝐼 . Otherwise,
(i) if 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 , B chooses a random
𝑢𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and sets 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃. B
sends 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) to A𝐼𝐼 as well as storing
((𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ), 𝑐𝑖 , 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )) to 𝑇2 ;
(ii) if 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 , the same as the case
when 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 ;
(iii) if 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 , the same as the case
when 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 ;
(iv) if 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 , B chooses a random
𝑢𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and sets 𝐻2 (𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝛿 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃. B
sends 𝐻2 (𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝛽 ) to A𝐼𝐼 as well as storing
((𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝛿 ), 𝑢𝑖 , 𝐻2 (𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝛿 )) to 𝑇2 .
(3) Key extraction queries: A𝐼𝐼 can make key extraction
queries on any identity 𝐼𝐷 ∈ ID such that 𝐼𝐷 ≠ 𝐼𝐷𝛼 .
If A𝐼𝐼 makes key extraction query on identity 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , B
just terminates the simulation and reports a failure.
Assume A𝐼𝐼 makes 𝑞𝑘 key extractions queries, for
each query on identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝑘 .
(i) If 𝐼𝐷𝑖 has existed in table 𝑇0 , assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) =
𝑐𝑖 𝑃; then B returns 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 𝑎𝑃 = 𝑎𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) to
A𝐼𝐼 .
(ii) Otherwise, B chooses a random 𝑐𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞 and
sets 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑖 𝑃. B returns 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 𝑎𝑃 to
A𝐼𝐼 and adds (𝐼𝐷𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖 , 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 )) to 𝑇0 .
(4) Original signer’s standard signing queries: A𝐼𝐼 can
query original signer’s standard signature on a warrant 𝑤𝑖 ∈ W under an identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ∈ ID. Assume
A𝐼𝐼 makes 𝑞𝑜𝑠 𝑠 original signer’s standard signing
queries. For each query, assume 𝐼𝐷𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖 have been
submitted to the 𝐻0 and 𝐻1 queries, respectively. If
they are not the cases, B performs the above algorithms to set values for 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) and 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ); then B
simulates 𝜎𝑤𝑖 as follows:
(i) If 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ≠ 𝐼𝐷𝛼 and 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑜 , assume
𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑖 𝑃 and 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃,
respectively; then B chooses a random 𝑟𝑖 ∈
Z𝑞 and returns the original signer’s standard
signature 𝜎𝑤𝑖 = (𝜎𝑤𝑖1 , 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 ) such that 𝜎𝑤𝑖1 =
𝑐𝑖 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑟𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) and
𝜎𝑤𝑖2 = 𝑟𝑖 𝑃 and to A𝐼𝐼 .
(ii) If 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ≠ 𝐼𝐷𝛼 and 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑝 , assume
𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑖 𝑃 and 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃, respectively; then B chooses a random 𝑟𝑖 ∈ Z𝑞
and returns original signer’s standard signature
𝜎𝑤𝑖 = (𝜎𝑤𝑖1 , 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 ) such that 𝜎𝑤𝑖1 = 𝑐𝑖 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 +
𝑟𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 = 𝑠𝑘𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) and 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 = 𝑟𝑖 𝑃 to A𝐼𝐼 .
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(iii) If 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 and 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑜 , assume
𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) = 𝑏𝑃 + 𝑐𝑖 𝑃 and 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 −
𝑏𝑃, respectively; then B simulates the original
signer’s standard signature 𝜎𝑤𝑖 = (𝜎𝑤𝑖1 , 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 )
by setting 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 = 𝑟𝑖 𝑃 = 𝑙𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃, where 𝑙𝑖 ∈𝑅 Z∗𝑞
and 𝜎𝑤𝑖1 = (𝑐𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖 )𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑘𝑖 𝑙𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑙𝑖 𝑏𝑃. It can be
verified that (𝜎𝑤𝑖1 , 𝜎𝑤𝑖2 ) is a correct simulation
since
𝜎𝑤𝑖1 = (𝑐𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖 ) 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑘𝑖 𝑙𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑙𝑖 𝑏𝑃
= 𝑎𝑏𝑃 + 𝑐𝑖 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑘𝑖 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑘𝑖 𝑙𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑙𝑖 𝑏𝑃 − 𝑎𝑏𝑃
= 𝑎 (𝑐𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃) + (𝑎 + 𝑙𝑖 ) (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃)

(9)
𝑒 (𝜎𝑀𝑖 1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒 ((𝑐1𝑖 + 𝑐𝛼 + V𝑖 ) 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑟1𝑖 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 )

= 𝑎𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝛼 ) + 𝑟𝑖 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 )
(iv) If 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 and 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑝 , since we do
not consider self-delegation in our scheme, then
B just terminates the simulation and reports
failure.
(v) If 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 and 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 , B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
(5) Proxy signing queries: A𝐼𝐼 can query a proxy signature on a message 𝑚𝑖 ∈ M under a warrant 𝑤𝑖 ∈ W
with the proxy signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷1𝑖 and the original
signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷2𝑖 such that 𝐼𝐷1𝑖 , 𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ∈ ID.
Assume 𝐼𝐷1𝑖 , 𝐼𝐷2𝑖 have been submitted to the 𝐻0
query and 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖 ‖ 𝑚𝑖 have been submitted to the
𝐻1 and 𝐻2 queries, respectively. If they are not the
cases, the above algorithms will be performed to
assign new values 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ), 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ), 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ), and
𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ). Assume A𝐼𝐼 makes 𝑞𝑝𝑠 proxy signing
queries. For each queries on a message 𝑚𝑖 with
warrant 𝑤𝑖 such that 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞𝑝𝑠 , B simulates the
corresponding proxy signature as follows:
(a) If 𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ≠ 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , 𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ≠ 𝐼𝐷𝛼 assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ) =
𝑐1𝑖 𝑃, 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ) = 𝑐2𝑖 𝑃; then B chooses two
random numbers 𝑟1𝑖 , 𝑟2𝑖 ∈ Z∗𝑞 and returns the
proxy signature 𝜎𝑖 = (𝜎𝑀𝑖 1 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 2 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 3 ) such that
𝜎𝑀𝑖 1 = c1𝑖 𝑎𝑃+𝑟1𝑖 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 )+𝑐2𝑖 𝑎𝑃+𝑟2𝑖 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )+
𝑟2𝑖 𝐻2 (𝑚𝑖 ), 𝜎𝑀𝑖 2 = (𝑟1𝑖 + 𝑟2𝑖 )𝑃 and 𝜎𝑀𝑖 3 = 𝑟2𝑖 𝑃 to
A𝐼𝐼 . It is a correct simulation since
𝑒 (𝜎𝑀𝑖 1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝑐1𝑖 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑟1𝑖 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) + 𝑐2𝑖 𝑎𝑃
+ 𝑟2𝑖 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) + 𝑟2𝑖 𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝑐1𝑖 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃)
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , (𝑟1𝑖 + 𝑟2𝑖 ) 𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑐2𝑖 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃)
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻2 (𝑚𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖 ) , 𝑟2𝑖 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )

(i) If 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑜 , 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 or 𝑤𝑖 ≠
𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑜 , 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 , B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
(ii) If 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑝 and 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 , assume
𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 and 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃 +
𝑎𝑃; B simulates the proxy signature 𝜎𝑖 =
(𝜎𝑀𝑖 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 ) by setting 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = 𝑟2𝑖 𝑃 =
1
2
3
3
V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃, 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = 𝑟1𝑖 𝑃 + V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃 and 𝜎𝑀𝑖 =
2
1
(𝑐1𝑖 + 𝑐𝛼 + V𝑖 )𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑟1𝑖 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 ) + 𝑘𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) +
𝑢𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃), where V𝑖 , 𝑟1𝑖 ∈ Zq . It can be
verified that it is a correct simulation since

(10)

⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 2 ) 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻2 (𝑚𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 3 )
(b) If 𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ≠ 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , 𝐼𝐷2𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ) =
𝑐1𝑖 𝑃, 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝛼 𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃; then

+ 𝑘𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) + 𝑢𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝑐1𝑖 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃)
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , (𝑟1𝑖 + 𝑟2𝑖 ) 𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑎𝑏𝑃 + 𝑐𝛼 𝑎𝑃 + V𝑖 𝑎𝑃
+ 𝑢𝑖 V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑢𝑖 𝑏𝑃 − 𝑎𝑏𝑃, 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝑐1𝑖 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃)
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , (𝑟1𝑖 + 𝑟2𝑖 ) 𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑎 (𝑏𝑃 + 𝑐𝛼 𝑃) , 𝑃)

(11)

⋅ 𝑒 ((V𝑖 − 𝑏) (𝑢𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃) , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 ) 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )
2

⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 )
3

(iii) If 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑝 , 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 or 𝑤𝑖 =
𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 , B performs the same as that
in case (ii).
(iv) If 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 and 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 , B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
(c) If 𝐼𝐷1𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , 𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ≠ 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , assume 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ) =
𝑐𝛼 𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃, 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ) = 𝑐2𝑖 𝑃, then
(i) if 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑜 and 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 , assume
𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃 and 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃 +
𝑎𝑃. B chooses 𝑙𝑖 , 𝑟2𝑖 ∈ Z∗𝑞 and simulates
the proxy signature 𝜎𝑖 = (𝜎𝑀𝑖 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 )
1
2
3
by setting 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = 𝑟2𝑖 𝑃, 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = V𝑖 𝑃−𝑏𝑃+r2𝑖 𝑃
3
2
and 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = (𝑐𝛼 + 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑐2𝑖 )𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑙𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) +
1
𝑟2𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) + 𝑟2𝑖 (𝑢𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃). It is a correct
simulation since
𝑒 (𝜎𝑀𝑖 1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒 ((𝑐𝛼 + 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑐2𝑖 ) 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑙𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃)
+ 𝑟2𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) + 𝑟2𝑖 (𝑢𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃) , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝑎𝑏𝑃
+ 𝑎𝑐𝛼 𝑃 + 𝑙𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑙𝑖 𝑏𝑃 + 𝑎𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑎𝑏𝑝
+ 𝑟2𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) , 𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑐2𝑖 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 , 𝑃)
⋅ 𝑒 (𝑟2𝑖 (𝑢𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃) , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝑎 (𝑐𝛼 𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃) , 𝑃)
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If 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) ≠ 𝑏𝑃 + 𝑐𝛼 𝑃 or 𝐻1 (𝑊∗ ) ≠ 𝑘𝛽 𝑃 or
𝐻2 (𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ ) ≠ 𝑢𝛿 𝑃, B will abort. Otherwise, given
∗
∗
∗
, 𝜎𝑀
, 𝜎𝑀
). B
the forged proxy signature 𝜎∗ = (𝜎𝑀
1
2
3
can solve the CDH problem

⋅ 𝑒 ((𝑙𝑖 + 𝑎 + 𝑟2𝑖 ) (𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) , 𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑐2𝑖 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑢𝑖 𝑃
+ 𝑎𝑃, 𝑟2𝑖 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )
⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 ) 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )
2

∗
∗
∗
− 𝑐𝛼 𝑎𝑃 − 𝑘𝛽 𝜎𝑀
− 𝑐2𝑖 𝑎𝑃 − 𝑢𝛿 𝜎𝑀
𝑎𝑏𝑃 = 𝜎𝑀
1
2
3

⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 )

(14)

3

when 𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷𝐴) = 𝑏𝑃 + 𝑐𝛼 𝑃, 𝐻1 (𝐼𝐷𝐵 ) = 𝑘𝛽 𝑃, and
𝐻2 (𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ ) = 𝑢𝛿 𝑃.

(12)
(ii) If 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑝 , 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 or 𝑤𝑖 ≠
𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →𝑝 , 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 , B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
(iii) If 𝑤𝑖 ≠ 𝑤𝛽 |𝐼𝐷𝛼 →0 and 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 , assume
𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃 and 𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝛽 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃 +
𝑎𝑃; B performs the same as that in case (i).
(iv) If 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 and 𝑚𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝛿 , assume
𝐻1 (𝑤𝛽 ) = 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 and 𝐻2 (𝑤𝛽 , 𝑚𝑖 ) = 𝑢𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃;
B chooses V𝑖 , 𝑟1𝑖 ∈ Z∗𝑞 and simulates the
proxy signature 𝜎𝑖 = (𝜎𝑀𝑖 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 ) by
1
2
3
setting 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃, 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃 +
3
2
𝑟1𝑖 𝑃, and 𝜎𝑀𝑖 = (𝑐𝛼 + 𝑐2𝑖 + V𝑖 )𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑟1𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 +
1
𝑘𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) + 𝑢𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃). It is a correct
simulation since

(i) 𝐼𝐷𝐴 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 .
(ii) 𝑊∗ = 𝑤𝛽 .
(iii) 𝑀∗ = 𝑚𝛿 .
Therefore, if A𝐼𝐼 has a nonnegligible probability 𝜖 in breaking
the proposed ID-based proxy signature scheme, then the
success probability of B in solving CDH problem is
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐷𝐻
B,G1
≥

𝑒 (𝜎𝑀𝑖 1 , 𝑃) = 𝑒 ((𝑐𝛼 + 𝑐2𝑖 + V𝑖 ) 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝑟1𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑃
+ 𝑘𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) + 𝑢𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) , 𝑃)

𝜖
(𝑞𝐻0 + 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑞𝑜𝑠 𝑠 + 2𝑞𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑞𝐻1 + 𝑞𝑜𝑠 𝑠 + 𝑞𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑞𝐻2 + 𝑞𝑝𝑠 )

.

(15)

which is nonnegligible. Thus, we reach a contradiction.

= 𝑒 ((𝑐𝛼 + 𝑏) 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑐2𝑖 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑟1𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑃 + 𝑘𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃)

Theorem 7. The revised ID-based proxy signature scheme is
secure against the A𝐼𝐼𝐼 chosen message and identity attack if
the CDH assumption holds.

+ (V𝑖 − 𝑏) 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑢𝑖 (V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) , 𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝑐𝛼 𝑃
+ 𝑏𝑃, 𝑎𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑘𝑖 𝑃, 𝑟1𝑖 𝑃 + V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) 𝑒 (𝑐2𝑖 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃)

Next, we analyze the success probability of B; B will not
abort if the following conditions hold:

(13)

⋅ 𝑒 (𝑢𝑖 𝑃, V𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑏𝑃) = 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷1𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )

Proof. The security is similar to that in Theorem 6. Thus, we
just describe it briefly.
(1) Setup, Hash queries, and Key extract queries are the
same as those in the security proof against a malicious
proxy signer.

⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻1 (𝑤𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 ) 𝑒 (𝐻0 (𝐼𝐷2𝑖 ) , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 )
2

⋅ 𝑒 (𝐻2 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝑀𝑖 )

(2) Proxy signer’s standard signing queries and Proxy
signing queries are similar to the Original signer’s
stand signing queries and Proxy signing queries in
the security for Theorem 6.

3

(v) If 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝛽 and 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝛿 , B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
(d) If 𝐼𝐷1𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , 𝐼𝐷2𝑖 = 𝐼𝐷𝛼 , B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
(6) Forgery: assume A𝐼𝐼 outputs a valid proxy signature
∗
∗
∗
, 𝜎𝑀
, 𝜎𝑀
) on message 𝑀∗ under a warrant
𝜎∗ = (𝜎𝑀
1
2
3
∗
𝑊 with the proxy signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐴 and the proxy
signer’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝐵 . Besides,
(i) 𝐼𝐷𝐴 has not been queried in the key extraction
queries,
(ii) (𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝑊∗ ) has not been queried in the delegation queries,
(iii) (𝐼𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐷𝐵 , 𝑊∗ , 𝑀∗ ) has not been queried in the
proxy signing queries,

Through simulation, it can be reduced that if there exists a
malicious original signer that can break the proposed scheme
with a nonnegligible probability 𝜖, then we can build another
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm B that can solve the
𝐶𝐷𝐻
such
CDH problem with a nonnegligible probability 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐B,G
1
that
𝐶𝐷𝐻
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐B,G
1

≥

𝜖

(16)

(𝑞𝐻0 + 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑞𝑝𝑠 𝑠 + 2𝑞𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑞𝐻1 + 𝑞𝑝𝑠 𝑠 + 𝑞𝑝𝑠 ) (𝑞𝐻2 + 𝑞𝑝𝑠 )

where 𝑞𝑝𝑠 𝑠 refers to the number of proxy signer’s standard
signing queries. Thus, we reach a contradiction.

10

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
Table 1: Comparison regarding the computational costs.

Schemes
ProSign
Wu et al.’s scheme [13] 2 ⋅ 𝐴 G1 + 2 ⋅ 𝑀G1 + 1 ⋅ 𝑇𝐻
Our scheme
3 ⋅ 𝐴 G1 + 4 ⋅ 𝑀G1 + 2 ⋅ 𝑇𝐻

ProVer
5 ⋅ 𝑃 + 4 ⋅ 𝑇𝐻
5 ⋅ 𝑃 + 4 ⋅ 𝑇𝐻

6.1. Efficiency Analysis. We analyze the efficiency of the
revised proxy signature scheme and compare it with the
original scheme. The detail computation costs are presented
in Table 1. As have been noticed, some algorithms in the
revised scheme remains unchanged; thus, we only concern
those algorithms that are different in our and the original
schemes. Let 𝑀G1 , 𝐴 G1 denote the multiplication add addition calculations in G1 , 𝑇𝐻 denote the calculation of hash
function (either 𝐻0 , 𝐻1 , or 𝐻2 ), and let 𝑃 denote the calculation of paring. We can see that our revised proxy signature
scheme involves only one addition, two multiplication, and
one hash operation in the proxy signing algorithm. As for the
expensive paring operations needed in the proxy verification
parts, the numbers are exactly the same.

7. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a practical attack which has not
been considered by some existing proxy signature schemes.
In particular, we took an identity-based proxy signature
scheme to describe how this attack works. We also presented
an enhanced security model that can capture this attack.
Our model has considered different types of potential adversaries against an identity-based proxy signature scheme and
allowed the adversary to query the individual signatures of
both the original signer and the proxy signer. The proposed
new scheme inherits the good features of the original scheme
and at the same time can effectively prevent the attack. The
proposed method can also be applied in other proxy signature
schemes [18–21] to ensure an improved security.
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